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I Introduction
Informal safety nets play a major role in helping people cope with negative shocks, even
in high income economies. Informal transfers generally ow through family and social
networks1 and are motivated, to a large extent, by altruism. Individuals give support to
others they care about.2 Thus, informal insurance provided by networks appears to be
mediated by altruistic transfers.
We provide the rst analysis of the risk-sharing implications of altruism networks. We
introduce stochastic incomes into the model of altruism in networks analyzed in Bourlès,
Bramoullé & Perez-Richet (2017). Agents care about each other and the altruism network
describes the structure of social preferences. For each realization of incomes, agents play
a Nash equilibrium of the game of transfers. Our objective is to understand how altruistic
transfers a¤ect the risk faced by the agents. Do altruism networks help smooth consump-
tion and how does this depend on the structure of the network?
We nd that altruism networks have a rst-order impact on risk and generate specic
patterns of consumption smoothing. In line with Becker (1974)s intuition, altruistic trans-
fers often mimick classical insurance schemes.3 Altruistic agents tend to give to others
when rich and receive from others when poor, which reduces the variability of consump-
tion. These e¤ects depend on the shape of the network, however. Our analysis unfolds in
three stages.
We rst identify two important benchmarks where equilibrium transfers generate e¢ -
cient insurance à la Townsend (1994). They yield e¢ cient insurance for any random incomes
if and only if the network of perfect altruistic ties is strongly connected. Every agent must
give another agents utility as much weight as she gives her own utility and these strong
caring relationships must indirectly connect everyone. All agents then have equal Pareto
weights. Perhaps more suprisingly, altruistic transfers also generate e¢ cient insurance for
small shocks when the network of transfers is weakly connected. This happens, for instance,
1See, e.g., Fafchamps & Gubert (2007), Fafchamps & Lund (2003), De Weerdt & Dercon (2006).
2See, e.g., Foster & Rosenzweig (2001), Leider et al. (2009), Ligon & Schechter (2012).
3In a context of household decision-making, The heads concern about the welfare of other members
provides each, including the head, with some insurance against disasters., Becker (1974, p.1076).
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in the presence of a rich benefactor in a connected community. Pareto weights then reect
individualspositions in the transfer network. In either case, noncooperative transfer ad-
justments in response to shocks operate as if agents were following the directives of a social
planner.
We next look at the general case. For utilities satisfying Constant Absolute Risk Aver-
sion (CARA) or Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA), we are able to bound the
expected deviation between equilibrium and e¢ cient consumption for arbitrary shocks.
We nd, in particular, that bridges play a major role under altruism and that informal in-
surance tends to be better when the average path length in the altruism network is shorter.
As discussed below, these features appear to be specic to the model of altruism in net-
works and may help identify the motives behind informal transfers. We then characterize
what happens for small shocks, leaving the structure of giving relationships invariant, and
for arbitrary utilities. We show that altruistic transfers yield e¢ cient insurance within the
weak components of the network of transfers. Moreover, the reverse property holds gener-
ically: If altruistic transfers generate e¢ cient insurance within groups, the structure of
giving relationships must be invariant and these groups must be the weak components of
the network of transfers. For small shocks, the extent of informal insurance thus critically
depends on the number and sizes of the weak components of the transfer network.
Third, we study how informal insurance depends on the networks structure, with the
help of numerical simulations. We consider a network of informal lending and borrowing
relations in a village in rural India, from the data of Banerjee et al. (2013). Under iid
incomes, we nd that various measures of an agents centrality are negatively correlated
with consumption variance. Thus, a more central agent in the altruism network tends
to have less variable consumption. We then show, analytically, that altruistic transfers
generate positive correlation in consumption streams across agents. Shocks propagate in
the altruism network. We nd, numerically, that these correlations tend to decrease as the
distance in the altruism network decreases. Finally, we look at the impact of adding a link
within the network. A new link connecting two agents generally reduces their consumption
variance. By contrast, it can decrease or increase the consumption variance of indirect
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neighbors.
Our analysis contributes to a growing literature studying informal transfers in net-
works.4 With stochastic incomes, Ambrus, Mobius & Szeidl (2014) characterize Pareto-
constrained risk-sharing arrangements under network capacity constraints. In a recent pa-
per, Ambrus, Milan & Gao (2017) adopt a similar approach, focusing on local informational
constraints. By contrast, with non-stochastic incomes, Bourlès, Bramoullé & Perez-Richet
(2017) characterize the Nash equilibria of a game of transfers where agents care about oth-
erswell-being. We introduce stochastic incomes to this setup and analyze the risk sharing
implications of altruism networks. This allows us to connect the analysis of altruism in
networks with the study of informal insurance.
We notably show that there are important di¤erences between the anatomy of risk
sharing in a model of altruism in networks and in models of network-constrained risk-
sharing arrangements. Structurally important links, like bridges or long-distance connec-
tions, have a strong impact on risk sharing under altruism but not in the other models.
Predictions on the e¤ect of shock size also di¤er. Starting from a situation with similar
incomes, small shocks generate no transfer under altruism but are perfectly insured under
capacity-constrained risk sharing, as in Ambrus, Mobius & Szeidl (2014). By contrast, ar-
bitrarily large shocks yield arbitrarily large transfers under altruism but saturate capacity
constraints. These ndings could help empirically distinguish between the di¤erent models
and motives.5
Our analysis further advances the economics of altruism, pioneered by Becker (1974)
and Barro (1974). With the exception of Bernheim & Bagwell (1988) and Laitner (1991),
this literature has abstracted away from the complex structures of real family networks.
Economic studies of altruism consider either small groups of completely connected agents
(e.g. Alger & Weibull (2010), Bernheim & Stark (1988), Bruce & Waldman (1991)) or
linear dynasties (e.g. Altig & Davis (1992), Galperti & Strulovici (2017), Laitner (1988)).
4One branch of this literature looks at network formation and stability, see e.g. Bloch, Genicot & Ray
(2007), Bramoullé & Kranton (2007a, 2007b).
5In an unpublished PhD dissertation, Karner (2012) derives di¤erential implications of altruism and
informal insurance on transfers and tests these implications on data from Indonesia. We thank Dilip
Mookherjee for bringing our attention to this interesting work.
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These structures are irrealistic. As is well-known from human genealogy, strong family ties
form complex networks. Bourlès, Bramoullé & Perez-Richet (2017) introduce networks into
a model of altruism à la Becker, for non-stochastic incomes. We build on this previous
analysis and look at whether and how altruism networks help agents smooth consumption.
Despite the key role played by altruistic support in helping real-world agents cope with
shocks, there has been surprisingly little work on altruism and risk, even in simple struc-
tures.6 Our analysis represents a leap forward for the literature, lling this gap: we analyze
the combined e¤ect of risk and complex networks on transfers and consumption.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model of altruism
in networks under stochastic incomes in Section 2. We analyze large shocks in Section 3
and characterize what happens with small shocks in Section 4. We investigate structural
e¤ects in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
II Setup
We introduce stochastic incomes into the model of altruism in networks analyzed in Bourlès,
Bramoullé & Perez-Richet (2017). Society is composed of n  2 agents who can care
about each other. Incomes are stochastic. Once incomes are realized, informal transfers are
obtained as Nash equilibria of a non-cooperative game of transfers. We rst describe how
transfers are determined conditional on realized incomes. We then introduce risk and the
classical notion of e¢ cient insurance.
A Transfers conditional on incomes
Agent i has income y0i  0 and can give tij  0 to agent j. By convention, tii = 0.
The collection of bilateral transfers T 2 Rn2+ denes a network of transfers. Income after
6Foster & Rosenzweig (2001) introduce altruism in a model of risk-sharing arrangements under limited
commitment between two agents. They derive predictions through simulations and test these predictions
on data from rural South Asia.
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transfers, or consumption, yi is equal to
yi = y
0
i  
X
j
tij +
X
k
tki (1)
where
P
j tij represents overall transfers made by i and
P
k tki overall transfers received by
i. Private transfers redistribute income among agents and aggregate income is conserved:P
i yi =
P
i y
0
i .
Agent i chooses her transfers to maximize her altruistic utility:
vi(y) = ui(yi) +
X
j 6=i
ijuj(yj) (2)
under the following assumptions. Private utility ui : R ! R is twice di¤erentiable and
satises u0i > 0, u
00
i < 0 and limy!1 u
0
i(y) = 0. Coe¢ cient ij 2 [0; 1] captures how
much i cares about js private well-being. By convention ii = 1. The altruism network
 = (ij)
n
i;j=1 represents the structure of social preferences.
7 In addition, we assume that
8i; j;8y; u0i(y)  iju0j(y) (3)
which guarantees that an agents transfer to a friend never makes this friend richer than
her.
In a Nash equilibrium, each agent chooses her transfers to maximize her altruistic utility
conditional on transfers made by others. Transfer network T 2 Rn2+ is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if the following conditions are satised:
8i; j; u0i(yi)  iju0j(yj) and tij > 0) u0i(yi) = iju0j(yj) (4)
In particular under CARA utilities ui(y) =  e Ay, equilibrium conditions become: 8i; j; yi 
yj   ln(ij)=A and tij > 0) yi = yj   ln(ij)=A.
Our analysis builds on equilibrium properties established in our previous paper.8 In par-
7These preferences could be exogenously given, or could be generated by primitive preferences where
agents care about othersprivate and social utilities, see Bourlès, Bramoullé & Perez-Richet (2017, p.678).
8Our assumptions di¤er slightly from the assumptions made in Bourlès, Bramoullé & Perez-Richet
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ticular, an equilibrium always exists, equilibrium consumption is unique, and the network
of equilibrium transfers is generically unique and has a forest structure. Formally, T has a
forest structure when it contains no non-directed cycle, i.e., sets of agents i1; i2; :::; il = i1
such that 8s < l; tisis+1 > 0 or tis+1is > 0.
Proposition 1 (Bourlès, Bramoullé & Perez-Richet 2017) A Nash equilibrium exists.
Equilibrium consumption y is unique and continuous in y0 and . Generically in ,
the network of equilibrium transfers is unique and is a forest.
B Stochastic incomes
We now consider stochastic incomes. Following each income realization, agents make equi-
librium transfers to each other. Proposition 1 ensures that there is a well-dened mapping
from incomes to consumption. Let ~y0 denote the stochastic income prole and ~y the re-
sulting stochastic consumption prole.9
To illustrate how altruistic transfers a¤ect risk, consider the following simple example.
Two agents care about each other with 12 = 21 = . They have common CARA
utilities u(y) =  e y. Let c =   ln(). Agentsincomes are iid with binary distribution:
y0i =     with probability 12 and y0i =  +  with probability 12 , with  > c=2. When
one agent has a positive shock and the other a negative one, the lucky agent makes a
positive transfer to the unlucky one. Altruistic transfers lead to the following stochastic
consumption: (y1; y2) = (   c=2;  + c=2) with probability 14 , ( + c=2;    c=2) with
probability 1
4
, (  ;   ) with probability 1
4
, (+ ; + ) with probability 1
4
.
In this example, consumption ~y is less risky than income ~y0 for Second-Order Stochastic
Dominance. The reason is that altruism entails giving money when rich and receiving
money when poor. Altruistic transfers in this case mimick a classical insurance scheme.
While informal insurance provided by altruistic transfers is generally imperfect, ~y becomes
less and less risky as  increases and idiosyncratic risks are fully eliminated when  = 1. In
(2017), to cover situations where altruism may be perfect and ij = 1. We describe in Appendix how our
previous results generalize to this extended setup.
9Throughout the paper, we denote random variables with tilde and specic realizations of these random
variables without tilde.
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the rest of the paper, we study how these e¤ects and intuitions extend to complex networks
and risks.
Our analysis relies on the classical notion of e¢ cient insurance, see e.g. Gollier (2001).
Denition 1 Informal transfers generate e¢ cient insurance if there exist Pareto weights
  0,  6= 0 such that consumption ~y solves
max
yP
i yi=
P
i y
0
i
X
i
iEui(yi)
E¢ cient insurance is a central notion, describing the ex-ante Pareto frontier with respect
to private utilities. It provides the conceptual foundation of a large empirical literature,
following Townsend (1994), which attempts to assess the extent of actual insurance in real
contexts. Note that
P
i iEvi =
P
i(
P
j jij)Eui. Therefore, a Pareto optimum with
respect to expected altruistic utilities always generates e¢ cient insurance. The converse
may not be true, however, and e¢ cient insurance situations may not constitute altruistic
Pareto optima.10
Let us next recall some well-known properties of e¢ cient insurance. When  > 0,
e¢ cient insurance is such that u0i(yi)=u
0
j(yj) = j=i for every income realization y
0. The
ratio of two agentsmarginal utilities is constant across states of the world. Dene y0 =
1
n
P
i y
0
i . When agents have common utilities and equal Pareto weights i = j = , this
leads to equal income sharing yi = y0. When agents have CARA utilities and
P
k ln(k) =
0, this yields yi = y0 + 1A ln(i). An agents consumption is then equal to the average
income plus a state-independent transfer. In general, an agents consumption is a function
of average income depending on Pareto weights and utilities.
10This concerns the extreme parts of the private Pareto frontier. If i is altruistic towards others, the
dictatorial private Pareto optimum where j = 0 if j 6= i is not an altruistic Pareto optimum. In general if
det(T ) 6= 0, a private Pareto optimum with weights  is an altruistic Pareto optimum i¤ (T ) 1  0.
In the literature on welfare evaluation, some researchers argue that social preferences should not be taken
into account when evaluating welfare, see e.g. Section 5.4 in Blanchet & Fleurbaey (2006).
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III Large shocks
A Perfect altruism
We rst identify a natural benchmark where altruistic transfers generate e¢ cient insurance
for any random incomes. Say that agent i is perfectly altruistic towards agent j if ij = 1.
The network of perfect altruism is the subnetwork of  which contains perfect altruistic
ties. The network of perfect altruism is strongly connected if any two agents are connected
through a path of perfect altruistic ties. Formally, for any i 6= j there exist a set of l
agents i1 = i, i2,..., il = j such that 8s < l; isis+1 = 1. Detailed proofs are provided in the
Appendix.
Proposition 2 Informal transfers generate e¢ cient insurance for every stochastic income
if and only if the network of perfect altruism is strongly connected. In this case, agents
have equal Pareto weights.
To prove su¢ ciency, we show how to combine equilibrium conditions to obtain the rst-
order conditions of the planners program. To prove necessity, we assume that the network
of perfect altruism is not strongly connected. We build instances of income distribution
for which altruistic transfers do not generate e¢ cient insurance.
Proposition 2 complements earlier results on equal income sharing, see Bloch, Genicot
& Ray (2008) and Proposition 1 in Bramoullé & Kranton (2007a).11 Consider, for example,
common utilities and suppose that any altruistic link is perfect ij 2 f0; 1g. Agent is best
response is to equalize consumption with her poorer friends. Proposition 1 shows that when
all agents seek to equalize consumption with their poorer friends and when the altruism
network is strongly connected, private transfers necessarily lead to overall equal income
sharing, i.e., yi = y0.
This result is straightforward when the network of perfect altruism is complete, as
all agents then seek to maximize utilitarian welfare. Proposition 2 shows, however, that
11Bloch, Genicot & Ray (2008) show that equal sharing in components is the only allocation consistent
with the social norm of bilateral equal sharing. Bramoullé & Kranton (2007a) show that if linked pairs meet
at random and share income equally, consumption converges to equal sharing in components. By contrast,
Proposition 2 identies conditions under which equal sharing in components emerges as the unique Nash
equilibrium of a game of transfers.
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perfect altruism also generates e¢ cient insurance in sparse networks such as the star and the
line or when two communities are connected by a unique bridge. In these cases, agents
interests are misaligned. Agents potentially care about distinct subsets of people. Still,
under connectedness, the interdependence in individual decisions embedded in equilibrium
behavior leads noncooperative agents to act as if they were following a planners program.
B Imperfect altruism
We next look at imperfect altruism. In general, how far can informal insurance induced
by altruistic transfers move away from e¢ cient insurance with equal Pareto weights? And
how does this depend on the structure of the altruism network?
To answer these questions, we consider common utilities and introduce a measure of dis-
tance from equal income sharing, DISP , as in Mobius, Ambrus & Szeidl (2014). Formally
given income realization y0,
DISP (y) =
1
n
X
i
jyi   y0j
where DISP (y)  0 and DISP (y) = 0, 8i; yi = y0. We can then compute the expected
value over all income realizations EDISP (~y) = E 1
n
P
i jyi   y0j such that EDISP (~y) =
0, 8y0;8i; yi = y0.
Next, we extend the notion of network distance to altruism networks. Following Bourlès,
Bramoullé & Perez-Richet (2017), introduce cij =   ln(ij) if ij > 0 as the virtual cost
of the altruistic link. Stronger links have lower costs. Dene the cost of a path as the sum
of the costs of the links in the path. If i and j are connected through a path of altruistic
links in , dene c^ij as the lowest virtual cost among all paths connecting i to j. For
instance when all links have the same strength ij 2 f0; g, then c^ij =   ln()dij where
dij is the usual network distance between i and j, that is, the length of a shortest path
connecting them. When links have di¤erent strengths, c^ij is a measure of altruism distance
between i and j accounting for the strength of altruistic ties in indirect paths connecting
the two agents. In particular, c^ij = 0 if and only if there is a path of perfect altruistic links
9
connecting i to j.
In our next result, we show that under CARA utilities and for any income realization,
distance to equal income sharing is bounded from above by a simple function of distances
in the altruism network.
Proposition 3 Assume that agents have common CARA utilities. If the altruism network
is strongly connected, then for any income realization:
DISP (y)  1
An2
X
i
max(
X
j
c^ij;
X
j
c^ji)
For every altruism network which is not strongly connected, EDISP (~y) can take arbitrarily
large values.
We prove this result by combining, in di¤erent ways, inequalities appearing in equilib-
rium conditions (4). In the Appendix, we show how to obtain similar bounds for other
measures of distance to equal income sharing and for other utility functions. For CRRA
utility functions, we show that the ratio DISP (y)=y0 is bounded from above by a simple
function of the altruism network. Note that for CARA utilities, the rst part of Proposi-
tion 2 follows directly from Proposition 3. When the network of perfect altruism is strongly
connected, 8i; j; c^ij = 0 and hence 8y0; DISP (y) = 0.
Proposition 3 identies specic structural features governing the extent of informal
insurance provided by altruistic transfers. It shows, in particular, that bridges play a critical
role. Suppose that the altruism network is formed of two separate, strongly connected
communities. Community-level shocks are not insured, and expected distance from equal
sharing can be arbitrarily large. Next, add a single link between the two communities. Ex-
post distance from equal sharing is now bounded from above and this bound is independent
of the size of the shocks. A large negative shock in one community generates large transfers
owing through the bridge. Both bridge agents play the role of transfer intermediaries and
help ensure that informal support from the rich community reaches the poor community.
More generally, Proposition 3 says that the quality of informal insurance depends on
the average altruism distance in the network. For instance if links are undirected and
10
have the same strength ij = ji 2 f0; g, the upper bound becomes 1A n(n 1)n2 d where d is
the average path length in the network, d = 2
n(n 1)
P
i<j dij. In general,
1
n
P
j c^ij measures
the average altruism distance from i to other agents, while 1
n
P
j c^ji measures the average
altruism distance from other agents to i. Then, 1
n
P
i max(
1
n
P
j c^ij;
1
n
P
j c^ji) is a measure
of average altruism distance in the network. This notably implies that informal insurance
induced by altruism is subject to small-world e¤ects, see Watts & Strogatz (1998). Starting
from a spatial network with long average path length, adding a few long-range connections
leads to a strong drop in average path length and hence to a potentially strong increase in
the quality of informal insurance.
These structural e¤ects may help distinguish altruism from network-constrained risk
sharing. In the social collateral model (Ambrus, Mobius & Szeidl (2014)), adding a bridge
to separate communities does not have much impact. A large negative shock on one com-
munity saturates the bridges capacity constraint, and the distance to equal income sharing
can be arbitrarily large. Similarly, a few long-range connections have little impact.12 Rather,
the extent of informal insurance in that model depends on the expansiveness of the net-
work, i.e., how the number of connections a group has with the rest of society varies as
group size increases. Average path length and expansiveness capture di¤erent aspects of a
networks geometry, indicating the profoundly di¤erent e¤ects the network structure can
have on informal insurance.
Proposition 3 applies to any income distribution. The bounds tightness may vary,
however, and tighter bounds can be obtained through other arguments or by making spe-
cic assumptions on income shocks. In the Appendix, we show that when  is strongly
connected, DISP (y)  1
A
1
2
maxi;j c^ij. For undirected binary networks, maxi;j c^ij = cdmax
where dmax is the networks diameter, i.e., the length of the longest shortest path. This
improves on Proposition 3 in some cases.
Alternatively, consider a strongly connected altruism network and income distributions
where a single agent i is subject to large shocks. If the shock is positive, the agents transfers
irrigate the whole community. Money ows, directly or indirectly, from i to any other agent.
12Bridges and long-distance connections also have little impact on overall informal insurance in a model
of risk sharing under local information constraints, see Ambrus, Gao & Milan (2017).
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Conversely if the shock is negative, money ows, directly or indirectly, from any other agent
to i. Consider a binary and undirected network and introduce di = 1n
P
j dij, a measure
of the average distance between i and other agents in society. In this case we can show
that under CARA, DISP (y) = c
A
1
n
P
j j di   dijj, see the Appendix. When a single agent
is subject to large shocks, the quality of informal insurance depends on the dispersion in
network distances to this agent.13
IV Small shocks
In this section, we characterize what happens with small shocks. More precisely, we con-
sider shocks that do not a¤ect transfer relationships - who gives to whom. Formally, given
equilibrium transfers T, introduce the directed binary graph of transfers G such that
gij = 1 if tij > 0 and gij = 0 if tij = 0. In Bourlès, Bramoullé & Perez-Richet (2017), we
showed that generically in  and in y0 there exists  > 0 such that if jjy^0   y0jj   then
the unique equilibrium T^ for incomes y^0 has the same graph of transfers as the equilibrium
T for incomes y0, and this graph is a forest. Thus, income variations which are relatively
small in magnitude generically leave G unchanged.14 They a¤ect, of course, the amounts
transferred and we next characterize the insurance properties of these transfer adjustments.
To present our main result, we need to introduce some additional notions and notations.
A weak component of G is a component of the undirected binary graph where i and j are
connected if gij = 1 or gji = 1. When i and j belong to the same weak component of forest
graph G, dene
cij =
X
s:gisis+1=1
cisis+1  
X
s:gis+1is=1
cis+1is
for the unique path i1 = i, i2,..., il = j such that 8s; gisis+1 = 1 or gis+1is = 1. Note that
cij is generally distinct from c^ij. While the altruism distance c^ij is greater than or equal
to zero and only depends on the altruism network , the parameter cij can take negative
13We see, again, the di¤erences in insurance patterns between altruism and social collateral. Under social
collateral, large shocks on one agent saturate all transfer capacities, leading to arbitrarily large departures
from equal income sharing.
14Note that some large income variations also leave G invariant. For instance with 2 agents and CARA
utilities, i gives to j in equilibrium i¤ y0i  y0j + cijA .
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values and also depends on who gives to whom.15 The interior of a set is the largest open
set included in it.
Theorem 1 (1) Let ~y0 be an income distribution and G a forest graph such that, for
any supported income realization, there exists a Nash equilibrium of the transfer game
with transfer graph G. Then altruistic transfers generate e¢ cient insurance within weak
components of G. If agent i belongs to weak component C of size nC, his Pareto weight i
is such that ln(i) = 1nC
P
j2C cij under normalization
P
j2C ln(j) = 0.
(2) Consider an income distribution whose supports interior is non-empty. Generically in
, if society is partitioned in communities and altruistic transfers generate e¢ cient insur-
ance within communities, then the graph of transfers is constant across income realizations
in the supports interior and these communities are equal to the weak components of the
transfer graph.
To prove the rst part of Theorem 1, we compare equilibrium conditions with the rst-
order conditions of the planners program. When i makes transfers to j in equilibrium,
the ratio of their marginal utilities is equal to the altruistic coe¢ cient: u0i(yi)=u
0
j(yj) = ij.
Under e¢ cient insurance, we would have u0i(yi)=u
0
j(yj) = j=i. We thus look for Pareto
weights such that j=i = ij. This equality can of course generally not be satised for all
pairs of agents. We show in the Appendix how to exploit the forest structure of equilibrium
transfers to nd appropriate Pareto weights. Our proof is constructive and based on the
explicit formulas provided in the Theorem. Note that the Pareto weights only depend on
 and G and hence do not depend on the specic income realization. Since money ows
within but not between weak components, this leads to e¢ cient insurance within weak
components.
In the second part of Theorem 1, we show that small shocks are, generically, the only
situations where altruistic transfers generate constrained e¢ cient insurance. We provide a
sketch of the proof here. The main idea is to exploit the rst part of the Theorem: locally
around some income prole, altruistic transfers generate constrained Pareto e¢ ciency with
15In fact, c^ij = cij i¤ i is connected to j in G via a path of giving relationships: gii2 > 0, gi2i3 > 0,...,
gil 1j > 0.
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known features (communities and Pareto weights). These features must then be consistent
with the original assumed pattern of constrained e¢ ciency, and we show that this can only
happen when the graph of transfers is invariant. An important step in the proof is to show
that generically in , the Pareto weight mapping G ! (G) is injective. Overall, this
result provides a generic characterization of situations of constrained e¢ cient insurance.
The rst part of Theorem 1 extends Theorem 3 in Bourlès, Bramoullé & Perez-Richet
(2017). It characterizes the income-sharing functions uncovered in that result and shows
that the transfer graphs weak components actually form endogenous risk-sharing commu-
nities.
Theorem 1 shows that, following small shocks, adjustments in altruistic transfers satisfy
a property of constrained e¢ ciency. Within a weak component of G, agents act as if they
were following a planners program. The quality of informal insurance provided by altruistic
transfers then depends on the connectivity of the transfer graph. Informal insurance is
e¢ cient if G is weakly connected. This happens, for instance, when one agent is much
richer or much poorer than all other agents. By contrast, agents fully support their income
risks when G is empty. This happens when 8i; j; ij < 1 and ~y = ~y01+ ~" for ~" small
enough. When di¤erences in incomes among agents are small in all realizations, agents make
no altruistic tranfers in equilibrium. By contrast, such small shocks would be e¢ ciently
insured in the social collateral model.
More generally, the extent of informal insurance depends on the number and sizes of
Gs weak components. Under common CARA utilities, the equilibrium consumption of
agent i in component C is equal to yi = y0C +
1
A
ln(i). Under iid income shocks, this
implies that V ar(yi) = 1nC V ar(y
0
i ) and an increase in componentssizes leads to a decrease
in consumption variance for all agents.16
The Pareto weights capture how the private preferences of an agent are represented in
the equivalent planners program. They reect agentspositions in the graph of transfers
16E¤ects are more complex when shocks are not iid. When shocks are independent but not identi-
cal, V ar(yi) = 1n2C
P
j2C V ar(y
0
j ). Consumption variance may be greater than income variance for an
agent with relatively low income variance. Note, however, that
P
i2C V ar(yi) =
1
nC
P
i2C V ar(y
0
i ) <P
i2C V ar(y
0
i ). Increases in variance for some agents would be more than compensated by decreases in
variance for others.
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and depend on the graphs full structure. For instance, a giving line where ti1i2 > 0, ti2i3 > 0,
..., tin 1in > 0 yields 1 > 2 > ::: > n. More generally an agents preferences tend to
be well-represented in the equivalent planners program when this agent has a relatively
higherposition in the network of transfers. This happens when he tends to give to others
towards whom he is not too altruistic, inducing higher cs.
A further implication is that local changes may have far-reaching consequences. Sup-
pose, for instance, that gij = 1 and consider a small increase in ij that does not change
the pattern of giving relationships. Let C be the weak component of i and j and dene
Ci as the weak component of i in the graph obtained from G by removing the link ij,
and similarly for Cj. Note that C = Ci [ Cj and Ci \ Cj = ?. Informally, Ci represents
agents indirectly connected to the giver while Cj represents agents indirectly connected to
the receiver.
Proposition 4 Suppose that gij = 1 and consider a small increase in ij leaving G unaf-
fected. Then, k decreases if k 2 Ci and increases if k 2 Cj.
Therefore the normalized Pareto weights of the giver and of agents indirectly connected
to her decrease, while the normalized Pareto weights of the receiver and of agents indirectly
connected to her increase. This implies that the consumption of agents in Ci decreases while
the consumption of agents in Cj increases, and hence Proposition 4 extends the rst part
of Theorem 4 in Bourlès, Bramoullé & Perez-Richet (2017).
V Network structure and informal insurance
In this Section, we study the impact of the network structure on consumption smoothing.
How is the position of an agent in the altruism network related to her consumption vari-
ance? How do altruistic transfers a¤ect the correlation structure of consumption streams
across individuals? How does a new link between two agents a¤ect their consumption vari-
ance? How does it a¤ect the consumption variance of other agents in the network? We
uncover some complex e¤ects, which we analyze through a combination of analytical results
and numerical simulations.
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As a preliminary remark, note that altruistic transfers generally a¤ect all moments
of the consumption distribution. Expected consumption may thus di¤er from expected
income. While these redistributive aspects are potentially interesting, we wish to focus
here on the risk-sharing implications of altruistic transfers. To do so, we identify a natural
benchmark where expected consumption is invariant. Altruistic ties are undirected when
8i; j; ij = ji. Say that the distribution of stochastic income ~y0 is symmetric if individuals
have the same expected income and if the whole prole is distributed symmetrically around
its expectation. Formally, ~y0 = 1 + ~" with E(~") = 0 and f(") = f( ") where f is the
pdf of ~". This covers iid symmetric distributions as well as distributions with income
correlation.
Proposition 5 Suppose that agents have common CARA utilities, that altruistic ties are
undirected, and that income distribution is symmetric. Then 8i; Eyi = Ey0i .
To prove this result, we prove that if equilibrium transfersT are associated with shock ",
then reverse transfers Tt are equilibrium transfers for shock  ".17 Symmetry assumptions
then guarantee the absence of redistribution in expectations.
We present results of numerical simulations based on the following parameter values.
We consider a real network of informal lending and borrowing relationships, connecting
111 households in a village in rural India drawn from the data analyzed in Banerjee et
al. (2013). The network is depicted in Figure 1. Altruistic links have strength  and
agents have CARA utilities ui(y) =  e Ay with   ln()=A = 3. Incomes are iid binary:
y0i = 0 with probability 0:5 and 20 with probability 0:5. We consider 10; 000 realizations
of incomes and, for each realization, we compute equilibrium transfers and consumption.
The analysis was replicated with lognormal incomes with the same mean and variance, and
all the results reported below were found to be robust.
17We thank Adam Szeidl for having rst made the connection between this property and the result of
no redistribution in expectation.
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Figure 1. A Network of Informal Risk Sharing
We start by looking at the relation between the network structure and the consump-
tion variance - covariance matrix. Are more central agents better insured? We compute
correlation coe¢ cients between consumption variance and di¤erent measures of centrality
(degree, betweenness centrality, eigenvector centrality), see Table 1. Correlation is clearly
negative and both quantitatively and statistically signicant.
Simulation Result 1: More central agents tend to have lower consumption variance.
On this dimension, the model of altruism in networks generates predictions similar to
those of the model of social collateral. It di¤ers from the model of local information con-
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straints, which generates positive correlation between consumption variance and centrality,
see Ambrus, Gao & Milan (2017).
We next look at correlations in consumption streams across individuals. We show that,
starting from independent incomes, altruistic transfers necessarily induce weakly positive
covariance in consumption across agents. This holds for any pair of agents, any altruism
network and any utility functions.
Proposition 6 Suppose that incomes are independent across agents. 8i; j; cov(~yi; ~yj)  0.
We obtain this result by relying on the global comparative statics of consumption with
respect to incomes, see Theorem 3 in Bourlès, Bramoullé & Perez-Richet (2017). This
result says that yi is weakly increasing in y0j for any i; j. A positive shock on any agents
income thus induces weakly positive changes in the consumption of every agent in society,
and conversely for negative shocks. To prove the result, we then combine this property
with two classical properties of the covariance operator.
Altruistic transfers thus tend to generate positive correlation across individualscon-
sumption streams. We next explore through simulations how these correlations depend on
the network distance between agents. Figure 2 depicts the correlogram of consumption
correlation between yi and yj as a function of network distance between i and j. We con-
sider all pairs at given distance d and compute the average correlation coe¢ cient (plain
line) as well as the 5th and 95th percentiles of the correlation distribution (dashed lines).
We see that consumption correlation is generally positive, consistentl with Proposition 6.
Furthermore,
Simulation Result 2: Consumption correlation tends to decrease with network distance.
Consumption correlation can reach very high levels for direct neighbors and then tends
to decrease at a decreasing rate as network distance increases.
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Figure 2. Consumption Correlation as a Function of Network
Distance
Finally, we study the impact of adding one altruistic link on agentsconsumption vari-
ances. We ran extensive numerical simulations for a variety of income distributions and
network structures. With iid incomes and under the assumptions underlying Proposition
5, the consumption variance of the two agents becoming connected generally drops.18 This
is consistent with Simulation Result 1: acquiring more links, or a better position, in the
network allows agents to reduce consumption variability in this framework. By contrast,
the new link may increase or decrease the consumption variance of other agents in the
network. Two opposite forces are at play here. On the one hand, the new link provides a
source of additional indirect support, which can help further smooth consumption. On the
other hand, the new neighbor is also a competitor for the support of the existing neighbor,
which can reduce the consumption smoothing.
For instance, with 3 agents, iid binary incomes and CARA utilities, we can show the
18We provide a simple example in the Appendix showing that if incomes are correlated, obtaining a new
connection may lead to an increase in consumption variance.
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following result (proof in Appendix). Start from a situation where agent 1 is connected to
agent 2 but not to agent 3. Add the connection between 2 and 3 to form a line, and V ar(y1)
drops. Next, close the triangle by adding the connection between 1 and 3, and V ar(y2)
increases. Connecting the two peripheral agents of a 3-agent line leads to an increase in
consumption variance for the center.
We next look at the impact of adding a link to a complex, real-world network, as shown
in Figure 3. We depict the new link in bold and focus on the region of the network close
to the new link. No change in variance is detected outside this region. Nodes for which we
detect a change in consumption variance are depicted in grey, with a symbol describing
the direction of the change.19 We observe both increases and decreases in consumption
variance for indirect neighbors.20 To sum up,
Simulation Result 3: Connecting two agents generally leads to a decrease in their con-
sumption variance and can lead to a decrease or an increase in the consumption variance
of other agents.
Figure 3. Impact of a New Link on Consumption Variances
19Because of numerical variability, we set a relatively high detection threshold t and only report variance
changes V ar(yi) such that jV ar(yi)j  t. Thus, Figure 3 likely does not report false positives (detected
changes are likely true changes) and may report false negatives (some true changes may not be detected).
20In unreported simulations, we also detected simultaneous decreases and increases in consumption
variance due to adding a new link in simple networks, such as when connecting the two peripheral agents
of a 5-agent line.
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VI Conclusion
We analyze the risk-sharing implications of altruism in networks. We nd that altruistic
transfers have a rst-order impact on risk. When the network of perfect altruistic ties
is strongly connected, altruistic transfers generate e¢ cient insurance with equal Pareto
weights for any shock. More generally, the distance to equal income sharing tends to
decrease with the average path length of the network, revealing a disproportionate impact of
bridges and long-distance connections. We then show that for shocks leaving the structure
of giving relationships unchanged, altruistic transfers generate e¢ cient insurance within
the weak components of the transfer network. Conversely, we show that generically these
are the only situations where altruistic transfers generate constrained e¢ cient insurance.
Finally, we uncover and investigate complex structural e¤ects.
We establish a connection between the analysis of altruism networks and the literature
on informal insurance. There are many interesting lines of research to be pursued in future
investigations. For instance, how do altruism networks a¤ect agents incentives to take
risks, see Alger & Weibull (2010)? How do altruism networks interact with classical risk-
sharing motives, see Foster & Rosenzweig (2001)? How can network data be exploited
empirically to identify motives behind informal transfers? More generally, how can network
models of informal transfers be applied to data?
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APPENDIX
Extension of previous results to perfect altruism. Bourlès, Bramoullé & Perez-
Richet (2017) assume that ij < 1 and u0i(y) > iju
0
j(y). We relax these assumptions
slightly here by assuming that ij  1 and u0i(y)  iju0j(y), allowing for perfect altruism.
Perfect altruism gives rise to unbounded Nash equilibria, caused by cycles in transfers. For
instance if two agents are perfectly altruistic towards each other 12 = 21 = 1 and have
the same utility functions and incomes, Nash equilibria are transfer proles of the form
(t12 = t; t21 = t), leaving incomes una¤ected. Theorems 1-4 in Bourlès, Bramoullé & Perez-
Richet (2017) then still hold under the new assumptions with two caveats. (1) Equilibrium
transfers are now not necessarily acyclic. An acyclic Nash equilibrium still exists, however.
To see why, suppose that there is a cycle in transfers: ti1i2 > 0,..., tili1 > 0. This implies
that u0i1(yi1)=u
0
i2
(yi2) = i1i2 ,... , u
0
il
(yil)=u
0
i1
(yi1) = ili1 . Multiplying all equalities yields
1 = i1i2 :::ili1 and hence ili1 = ::: = ili1 = 1. Cycles in transfers can only happen
in cycles of perfect altruistic ties. Then, let t = min(ti1i2 ; :::; tili1). Removing t from all
transfers in the cycle yields another Nash equilibrium, and repeating this operation leads
to an acyclic Nash equilibrium. (2) The genericity condition in  must be supplemented
by the condition that  does not contain directed cycles of perfect altruistic ties. This then
guarantees that Nash equilibria are acyclic.
Proof of Proposition 2. We will make use of the following properties established in
Bourlès, Bramoullé & Perez-Richet (2017). Dene ^ij = e c^ij if c^ij < 1 and ^ij = 0
otherwise. Then, 8i; j; u0i(yi)  ^iju0j(yj) and u0i(yi) = ^iju0j(yj) if there is a directed path
connecting i to j in T. Next, suppose that i is much richer than everyone else. Then
money indirectly ows from i to every other agent j such that ^ij > 0 and 8i; j : ^ij >
0; u0i(yi) = ^iju
0
j(yj).
Observe that the network of perfect altruistic ties is strongly connected if and only if
8i; j; ^ij = 1. If this holds, then 8i; j; u0i(yi)  u0j(yj) and hence u0i(yi) = u0j(yj): These are
the rst-order conditions of the problem of maximizing utilitarian welfare. Next, suppose
that there exist i and j such that ^ij < 1. Dene y0 such that y0i = Y and 8k 6= i; y0k = 0.
If ^ij = 0, money cannot ow from i to j. As Y increases, consumption yi tends to1 while
yj = 0. If Y is large enough, u0i(yi) < u
0
j(yj). If ^ij > 0, then u
0
i(yi) = ^iju
0
j(yj) < u
0
j(yj)
if Y is large enough. Similarly, dene ~y0 such that ~y0j = Y and 8k 6= j; ~y0k = 0. Since
^ji  1, u0j(~yj)  u0i(~yi) if Y large enough. Under e¢ cient insurance, we would then have
j < i and j  i, a contradiction. Therefore, altruistic transfers do not generate e¢ cient
insurance. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall; 8i; j; u0i(yi)  ^iju0j(yj). This is equivalent to:
(u0j)
 1( 1
^ij
u0i(yi))  yj. Summing over j leads to:X
j
(u0j)
 1(
1
^ij
u0i(yi))  ny0
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We also have 8i; j; u0j(yj)  ^jiu0i(yi) and hence yj  (u0j) 1( 1^jiu0i(yi)), leading to
ny0 
X
j
(u0j)
 1(
1
^ij
u0i(yi))
Under common CARA utilities, this yields
1
An
X
j
c^ji  yi   y0  1
An
X
j
c^ij
and hence jyi y0j  1An max(
P
j c^ij;
P
j c^ji). Finally,DISP (y)  1An2
P
i max(
P
j c^ij;
P
j c^ji).
Next, we illustrate how to compute similar bounds for other measures of distance and
other utility functions. Introduce SDISP (~y) = [E 1
n
P
i(yi  y0)2]1=2 as in Ambrus, Mobius
& Szeidl (2014). We obtain:
SDISP (~y)  1
A
1
n3=2
[
X
i
max(
X
j
c^ij;
X
j
c^ji)
2]1=2
When the network is binary and undirected, the bound becomes   ln()
A
1
n3=2
[
P
i;j d
2
ij]
1=2.
Then, 1
n(n 1)
P
i;j d
2
ij =
d2+V (d) where V (d) is the variance of path lengths. Thus, SDISP
tends to be lower when average path length and path length variance are lower.
Alternatively, consider common CRRA utilities: u(y) = y1 =(1   ) if  6= 1 and
u(y) = ln(y) if  = 1. This yields
(
1
n
X
j
^
1=
ji   1)y0  yi   y0  (
1
1
n
P
j ^
1=
ij
  1)y0
and hence
DISP (y)  1
n
X
i
max(1  1
n
X
j
^
1=
ji ;
1
1
n
P
j ^
1=
ij
  1)y0
which simplies to DISP (y)  1
n
P
i(
1
1
n
P
j 
dij=
  1)y0 for undirected, binary networks.
Finally, consider common CARA utilities and suppose that the network of altruism is
not strongly connected. Then, there exists a set S such that S 6= ?, N   S 6= ?, there
exists a path between any two agents in S in , and no agent in S cares about an agent not
in S. Consider the income distribution such that y0i = Y > 0 if i 2 S and y0i = 0 if i =2 S.
Then, there is no transfer in equilibrium and y = y0. This yields DISP (~y) = n nS
n
Y .
QED.
Proof of alternative bound on p.11. Denote by c^max = maxi;j c^ij. Since 8i; j; u0i(yi) 
^iju
0
j(yj), 8i; j; yi  yj + c^ij=A  yj + c^max=A. This implies that ymax   ymin  c^max=A
where ymax = maxi yi and ymin = mini yi. Consider the problem of maximizing DISP (y)
under the constraint that ymax   ymin =  where  is some arbitrarily xed value. The
solution to this problem is to set yi = ymax for n=2 agents if n is even and for (n + 1)=2
agents if n is odd and yi = ymin for n=2 agents if n is even and for (n  1)=2 agents if n is
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odd. This yields DISP (y) = 1
2
 if n is even and = (1
2
  1
2n2
) if n is odd. This implies
that, in general, DISP (y)  1
2
(ymax   ymin)  12 c^max=A. QED.
Proof of computations on p.11. Suppose agent i is subject to large shocks. If the shock
is positive, 8j; u0i(yi) = ^iju0j(yj). This yields yi = yj+ cAdij. Taking the average over j yields
yi = y
0 + c
A
di and yj = y0 + cA(
di   dij). If the shock is negative, 8j; u0j(yj) = ^jiu0i(yi)
and hence yj = yi + cAdij and yi = y
0   c
A
di and yj = y0 + cA(dij   di). This leads to
1
n
P
i jyi   y0j = cnA
P
i j di   dijj. QED.
Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma A1 Fix a transfer graph G. For any i; j; k, we have: cji =  cij, cij + cjk = cik
and ln(i)  ln(j) = cij. Further,
P
i ln(i) = 0.
Proof: (1) The path leading from j to i reverses all directions from the path leading from
i to j, leading to the rst property. (2) Suppose that j lies on the path connecting i to
k. By denition, cik = cij + cjk. If k lies on the path connecting i to j, we then have
cij = cik+ ckj = cik cjk. Next, suppose that l is the last agent lying both on the path from
i to k and on the path from i to j. Then, cik = cil + clk and cij = cil + clj. Moreover, the
path from k to j is formed of the path from k to l and of the path from l to j. Therefore,
ckj = ckl + clj. This yields: cik + ckj = cil + clk + ckl + clj = cil + clj = cij. (3) Applying
these two properties, we obtain:
ln(i)  ln(j) = 1nC
P
k2C(cik   cjk) = 1nC
P
k2C(cik + ckj) =
1
nC
P
k2C cij = cij
(4). Finally, note that
P
i ln(i) =
1
nC
P
i;j cij =
1
nC
P
i<j(cij + cji) = 0. QED.
Lemma A2 Consider an income realization y0, equilibrium transfers T with transfer graph
G. Let C be a weak component of G. Then, equilibrium consumption prole yC on C
solves the planners program: max~yC
P
i iui(~yi) under the constraint
P
i2C ~yi =
P
i2C y
0
i
and with i such that ln(i) = 1nC
P
j2C cij.
Proof: Consider i and j in C, connected through the path i1 = i, i2,..., il = j. If gisis+1 = 1,
then equilibrium conditions imply that ln(u0is(yis)) ln(u0is+1(yis+1)) =  cisis+1. If gis+1is = 1,
then ln(u0is(yis))  ln(u0is+1(yis+1)) = cis+1is . Summing over all agents in the path yields
ln(u0i(yi))  ln(u0j(yj)) =  cij = ln(j)  ln(i)
by Lemma A1. These correspond to the rst-order conditions of the planners program.
In addition, no money ows from C to N  C or from N  C to C. Therefore,Pi2C y0i =P
i2C yi and aggregate income is preserved within C. QED.
Suppose that for any income realization, there is a Nash equilibrium with transfer graph
G. Then, the is do not depend on the income realization and the rst part of Theorem
1 follows directly from Lemma A2.
For the second part, consider an altruism network  satisfying the following property.
Consider an undirected cycle, that is, a binary graph U connecting l agents i1,..., il = i1
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such that either uisis+1 = 1 or uis+1is = 1 and uij = 0 if i and j are not two consec-
utive agents in the set . Then,
P
s:uisis+1=1
cisis+1  
P
s:uis+1is=1
cis+1is 6= 0 . In Bourlès,
Bramoullé & Perez-Richet (2017), we showed that such networks are generic and that
they always have a unique Nash equlibrium. Given a binary directed forest G, dene
Y0(G) = fy0 2 Y0 : the transfer graph of the Nash equilibrium is Gg the set of income re-
alizations leading to G and Y0(G) its interior. Observe that the non-empty sets Y0(G)
dene a nite partition of Y0. Dene (G) the prole of Pareto weights as dened in the
rst part of Theorem 1. This mapping satises the following useful property.
Lemma A3 Consider two binary directed trees G and H. Then, (G) = (H)) G = H.
Proof: Let  = (G) = (H) and suppose that G 6= H. There exists i; j such that
gij = 1 and hij = 0. Since gij = 1, ln(i)   ln(j) = cij. Since  = (H), ln(i)  
ln(j) = cij =
P
s:hisis+1=1
cisis+1 
P
s:his+1is=1
cis+1is for an undirected path connecting i to
j. The set i; i2; :::; il = j; i then denes an undirected cycle satisfying
P
s:uisis+1=1
cisis+1  P
s:uis+1is=1
cis+1is = 0, which is impossible given our assumptions on . QED.
Suppose rst that there is only one community in the partition. In other words, altruistic
transfers generate e¢ cient insurance for Pareto weights . This implies that there exist
functions fi such that 8y0 2 Y0; yi = fi(
P
j y
0
j ). Let G be any graph such that Y0(G) 6= ?.
Such a graph exists by the assumption that Y0 6= ?. Suppose that G is disconnected.
Then by the rst part of Theorem 1, there exist functions gi such that 8y0 2 Y0(G), yi =
gi(
P
j2C y
0
j ) = fi(
P
j2C y
0
j +
P
j2N C y
0
j ). This implies that 8y0 2 Y0(G);
P
j2N C y
0
j = L
which contradicts the fact that Y0(G) is a non-empty open set.
Therefore, G is connected and hence is a tree. By the rst part of Theorem 1, there
is e¢ cient risk sharing on Y0(G) for Pareto weights (G). 8i; j; u0i(yi)=u0j(yj) = j=i =
j=i. This implies that there exists t > 0 such that  = t(G). Next consider another
graph H for which Y0(H) 6= ?. By the same reasoning, there exists t0 > 0 such that
 = t0(H). Since (G) and (H) satisfy the same normalization
P
j ln(j) = 0, then
(G) = (H). By Lemma A3, G = H. Therefore, Y0 = Y0(G).
Finally, suppose that the partition is composed of several communities. Apply, rst, the
previous reasoning to each community C considered separately. There exists a tree graph
GC connecting agents in C and such that C = tC(GC) for tC > 0 and C Pareto weights
within C and GC describes the pattern of giving relationships within C. Next, let us show
that for any income realization in the supports interior, an agent in one community cannot
give to an agent in another. Constrained e¢ ciency implies income conservation within
communities: 8C;Pi2C yi = Pi2C y0i . Suppose that for some y0 2 Y0, there are some
intercommunity transfers. The graph connecting communities is also a forest. Therefore,
there exists a community connected to other communities through a single link. Formally,
there exists C 6= C 0 such that i 2 C, j 2 C 0 and tij > 0 or tji > 0 and where there is no
other giving link connecting C and N  C. If tij > 0, this implies
P
i2C yi =
P
i2C y
0
i   tij.
If tji > 0, this implies
P
i2C yi =
P
i2C y
0
i + tij. In either case,
P
i2C yi 6=
P
i2C y
0
i , which
contradicts the original assumption. QED.
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Proof of Proposition 4 If ij increases, cij decreases. Then, ckl decreases if the link ij
lies on the path connecting k to l. By contrast, ckl increases if the link ji lies on the path
connecting k to l. Agents in Ci are connected through agents in Cj through the link ij, and
this link does not appear on the path connecting agents in Ci. This implies that
P
l2C ckl
decreases if k 2 Ci. Similarly,
P
l2C ckl increases if k 2 Cj. QED.
Proof of Proposition 5. Given transfers T, observe that Tt represent reverse transfers
with identical amounts owing in opposite directions. We rst establish that reverse trans-
fers form an equilibrium for the opposite shock. Denote by y0(") = 1 + " and by y(")
the associated equilibrium consumption.
Lemma A4 Let T be a Nash equilibrium for incomes y0(") leading to consumption y(").
Then, Tt is a Nash equilibrium for incomes y0( ") and y(")  y0(") = y0( ")  y( ").
Proof: Note that y = 1+ " T1+Tt1. Denote by y0 the consumption associated with
transfers Tt when incomes are 1  ". Then, y0 = 1  " Tt1+T1. Comparing yields:
y   1  " = 1  "  y0 and hence y(")  y0(") = y0( ")  y0. Equilibrium conditions
on T are: (1) 8i; j; yi   yj  cij=A, and (2) tij > 0 ) yi   yj = cij=A. Next, let us check
that Tt satisfy the equilibrium conditions for incomes y0( "). We have: y0i = 2 yi. This
implies that y0i y0j = yj yi. Therefore, 8i; j; y0i y0j = yj yi  cji=A = cij=A since the ties
are undirected. In addition, (Tt)ij = tji and tji > 0 ) yj   yi = cji=A ) y0i   y0j = cij=A.
QED.
We have: E(yi y0i ) =
R
"
[yi(") y0i (")]f(")d". In the integral, the term associated with
no shock is equal to 0, yi(0) = y0i (0). The term associated with shock " is equal to [yi(") 
y0i (")]f(")d". The term associated with shock  " is equal to [yi( ")  y0i ( ")]f( ")d" =
[y0i (")   yi(")]f(")d" by Lemma A4 and by shock symmetry. The sum of these terms is
then equal to 0 and the integral aggregates such sums. QED.
A new connection can increase consumption variance under income correlation.
Consider agents 1, 2 and 3 with incomes (12; 0; 0) with probability 1=2 and (0; 12; 12) with
probability 1=2. Note that this satises the symmetry assumption of Proposition 5. Agents
have common CARA utilities with   ln()=A = 2. In the original network, 1 and 2 are
connected and 3 is isolated. Consumption is (7; 5; 0) with proba 1=2 and (5; 7; 12) with
proba 1=2. Next, connect 2 and 3. Consumption becomes (6; 4; 2) with proba 1=2 and
(6; 8; 10) with proba 1=2. Agent 2 faces a more risky consumption prole. Here, the
income streams of agent 2 and 3 are perfectly positively correlated. Agent 2s consumption
becomes lower when poor and higher when rich, due to this new connection.
Variance computations on p.20. With 3 agents, there are 8 states of the world.
Consider, rst, the network where 1 and 2 are connected and 3 is isolated, see the example
in Section 2.1. Since c < 2, the variance of y1 and y2 drops from 2 to 12
2 + 1
4
c2.
Next, connect agents 2 and 3 to form a line. We assume that altruism is high enough
to induce transfer paths of length 2 in situations where a single peripheral agent has
a positive or a negative shock. This is satised i¤ c < 2
3
. Computing transfers and
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consumption for each state of the world, we nd, V ar(y1) = V ar(y3) = 13
2 + 1
18
c+ 19
36
c2
and V ar(y2) = 13
2   1
9
c + 1
9
c2. All variances drop. Finally, connect agents 1 and 3 to
form the triangle. Consumption variance for any agent is now equal to 1
3
2 + 1
6
c2. V ar(y2)
increases while V ar(y1) = V ar(y3) decreases. QED.
Proof of Proposition 6. Our proof makes use of the following classical properties
of the covariance operator, see e.g. Gollier (2001). First, if f and g are non-decreasing
functions and ~X is some random variable, then, cov(f( ~X); g( ~X))  0. Second, the law
of total covariance states that if ~X; ~Y ; ~Z are three random variables, then cov( ~X; ~Y ) =
E(cov( ~X; ~Y jZ)) + cov(E( ~XjZ); E( ~Y ; Z)).
Given set of agents S, denote by y0 S the vector of incomes of agents not in S.
Apply the law of total covariance to variables ~yi; ~yj and ~y0 1. This yields cov(~yi; ~yj) =
E(cov(~yi; ~yjjy0 1)) + cov(E(~yijy0 1); E(~yjjy0 1)). Note that conditional on y0 1, yi and yj are
deterministic, non-decreasing functions of y01 by Theorem 3 in Bourlès, Bramoullé & Perez-
Richet (2017). By the property of the covariance of monotone functions, this implies that
8y0 1, cov(~yi; ~yjjy0 1)  0 and hence E(cov(~yi; ~yjjy0 1))  0. Next, let f1 denote the pdf of
~y01. By independence,
E(~yijy0 1) =
Z
yi(y
0
1;y
0
 1)f1(y
0
1)dy
0
1
Since yi(y01;y
0
 1) is non-decreasing in y
0
2, this implies thatE(~yijy0 1) is also non-decreasing in
y02. We can therefore repeat the argument: cov(E(~yijy0 1); E(~yjjy0 1)) = E(cov(~yi; ~yjjy0 1;2))+
cov(E(~yijy0 1;2); E(~yjjy0 1;2)) where E(cov(~yi; ~yjjy0 1;2))  0 by monotonicity. Dimension-
ality is reduced at each step, and all terms are non-negative. QED.
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